bs vs. bs, was: drugs vs. guns

Topics: Theory, Crime
05 May 1994

From: ervan

As far as I can tell, most of your (Nat's) last post has left the
subject of gun control entirely and instead is trying to make the
following point:

There are some things have such large negative externalities that
prohibition is called for.

I agree with that. I'm not prepared to legalize personal nukes.
It simply becomes a debate of cost versus benefit. There are generally
two costs to consider:
1) The cost imposed on the person whose freedom is restricted.
2) The cost of enforcing the prohibition (in its many different
forms, $, civil liberties, precedent value, etc.)
versus the benefit:
3) Degree of suppression of negative externalities.

I see the particulars of prohibition as follows:
(1) (2) (3)
nukes low low very high
handguns high high moderate
assault rifles high moderate low
drugs high very high very low

Things which have a large (3)/( (2) + (1) ) should be banned.
(Actually, I'd prefer that many such things be kept legal subject
only to proof of financial ability to compensate for the down side).

So, as for nunneries, sure. Your calculus of controlling dynamite is
acceptable there. As for stoned drivers, I don't believe the numbers
add up to support your case, not even close. *IF* it were the
case that:
1) drug X was worth only $1/dose to people AND
2) stoned drivers accidently killed five totally uninvolved people
every time they used it AND
3) a prohibition could be enforced cheaply AND
4) there were no other cheap ways to achieve the same effect (like free
X zones),
then I'd go along with prohibition. In the real world, I don't find
any of those conditions to be true, least of all the whole set.

The interesting question is how to measure (1). At this point, you put
on your socialist hat and say:

> [cars are more "legitimate" than drugs]

In other words, things you like are legitimate and things that I like
are not (this is what I meant by comparing whiskey to refrigerators).
This is exactly the fatal conceit of socialism, that central planners
know what's best and what people really (should) want. I reject that.
The proper way to measure (1) is by how much people are willing to pay.
That's the value of what's being destroyed by a prohibition.

> [ someone valuing something more is not sufficient to make it legal ]

True but irrelevant. The question is what value is being taken
away by prohibition. You've simply argued in a circle by begging the
question of illegitimacy with illegality. Here is the implicit
arugment you seem to be making:
1) Alcohol is illegitimate because I don't like it (or whatever).
2) It has negative externalities.
3) Therefore it should be illegal.
4) Since it should be illegal, it has no legitimate value.
5) Therefore (1) should not enter into the prohibition equation.
That's a non-argument.

My construction follows through without change for those things which I
think of as crime, i.e. theft. (3) > (1) in the case of theft. This
is demonstrated immediately by the fact that the two parties could not
find an aggreable price for the transaction at hand. (This is not my
usual philosophical construction; I only wanted to show consistency
here).

As for the question of intent, it does matter, even in this framework.
I just gave the essential reason. If someone intends to murder, we
have a clear case of theft (of self), i.e. (3) > (1). Every such
transaction is necessarily a loser. If instead, we have negligent
manslaughter, the value of driving (for instance) is spread out over
multiple instances where the negative externality does not occur. Thus
the balance must be carefully considered. Murders and traffic
accidents are two different things (despite possible kinetic
similarities). Different mechanisms are appropriate to each.

If there is some weapon which can only be used to commit a crime, then
it is tolerable to infer intent. I don't see that as being a safe
inference for any of the weapons under discussion.

As another aside, the flip side of this whole issue is positive
externalities, i.e. public goods. I want to say that I don't a think a
similar analysis is appropriate because we step into the realm of
forcing people to do something against their will instead of merely
restraining them from engaging in (externally) dangerous activities.

In summary, I agree that there are a (very small) number of activities
which should be banned because of possible accidents. I do not agree
that value can be established in any way but what something is worth to
the person in question.



---Ervan


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